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Abstract:  In May 2014 for the eighth time in the history of European integration, citizens across Europe 
had the opportunity to vote in the only directly elected transnational legislative elections in the world.  This 
was the first EU parliamentary election held since the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, which brought 
political and institutional changes ostensibly designed to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the EU.   
Ironically, neither the expanded powers of the European Parliament, nor its rallying slogan of  “this time 
it’s different” succeeded in mobilizing voters and instead, the downward trend in turnout continued with an 
abstention rate of nearly 58 %.  What was in fact ‘different this time’ around was the strongest showing to 
date of radical right and anti-EU parties gaining a record number of seats.  This paper aims to show that this 
result is intrinsically linked to the on-going global economic crisis and the subsequent austerity policies 
adopted by the EU, which created a veritable Petri dish for growth of populist backlash.  In contrast to 
media characterizations of the election outcome as a “political earthquake” and a disaster for the European 
project, we argue that the results were fairly predictable and less damaging than generally presumed by 
critics of the purported democratic deficit. To substantiate this assertion, we put EU voter turnout and the 
present partisan and ideological trends in historical and comparative perspective and discuss the 
relationship between EU level developments and attitudes within the Member States.  An in-depth analysis 
of the elections then shows that the regional political crisis stems largely from a mismatch between 
tenacious national identities and political discourses, and EU level policies operating within an ever 
integrated, dysfunctional global economy.  
 
*Publication Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper are entirely those of the 
author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Parliament.  
 
 In late May of 2014 elections across the 28 Member States of the European Union 
took place bringing 751 members (MEPs) to serve a five year term in the only 
transnational, directly elected legislative body in the world.  The European Parliament is 
a complex institution that--like the EU more broadly—is sometimes poorly understood 
by European citizens and the media alike. These particular elections, the eighth time 
since direct elections began in 1979, marked the first European Parliamentary elections 
since the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, which is notable because of its intention of 
enhancing the democratic legitimacy of the EU.  Indeed the EU promoted the elections 
under the slogan of  “this time it’s different”1--a big claim but, in fact, a rather prosaic 
reference to the treaty’s injunction to European government leaders to propose a 
candidate for Commission President that would “take into account” the results of the 
elections of the European Parliament.2  Various initiatives were launched capitalizing on 
this opportunity to assert the growing powers of the EU’s only directly elected body and 
to show voters that by participating in the legislative elections, they could also influence 
the future leadership of the Commission, the executive (and , in public perception, the 
most technocratic) authority of the EU.  The most innovative “get out the vote” effort was 
the introduction of the Spitzenkandidaten – “lead candidates” nominated by the major 
European political parties for the European Commission presidency, who participated in 
a series of public, televised and online debates.  The first of such debates was held at the 
University of Maastricht and webcast to many other university campuses underscoring 
the concern for appealing to younger generations.   
 In reality, these developments were eclipsed by the media’s fascination with the 
campaigns of figures such as France’s Marine Le Pen and UKIP’s Nigel Farage and 
despite initial estimates of a 43.09% turnout and a much hoped for reversal of declining 
turnout, the final figure was confirmed at 42.54.  Low turnout and the success of the 
radical right and anti-EU parties in gaining more seats than ever before dominated the 
                                                            
1 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20140210BKG35568/html/THE-2014-
EUROPEAN-ELECTIONS-THIS-TIME-IT’S-DIFFERENT 
2 Article 17(7) TEU  For more discussion of this change, see 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/140829REV1-Role-of-the-President-of-the-European-Commission-
FINAL.pdf 
 
 
news reports of the election outcome with the term “political earthquake” being the most 
common depiction of the results and an almost universal conclusion that the elections 
were a harbinger of the potential, slow demise of the European project.   
 This paper offers a more tempered interpretation of the elections and attempts to 
draw out the implications for the state of the European Union and global democratic 
politics more generally.  We organize the paper into two main parts beginning by putting 
EU voter turnout and the present partisan and ideological trends in historical and 
comparative perspective and discussing the relationship between EU level developments 
and political attitudes within the Member States.  The second part of the paper provides 
an in-depth analysis and discussion of the elections.  The paper concludes with a 
summary of our argument that the regional political crisis in Europe cannot be 
understood in isolation from the deeper global economic crisis which at the EU level  is 
manifested largely as a mismatch between national political discourses, EU level policies 
and global economic realities.  
 
The EU Elections in Historical and Comparative Perspective 
 In her 2006 book Democracy in Europe Vivien Schmidt made the strikingly 
simple yet trenchant observation that a key problem for the national polities of the EU 
Member States and for the EU itself, which she describes as a “regional state,” is that 
European integration has produced a phenomenon of  ‘politics without policies’ at the 
national level and ‘policies without politics’ at the EU level (2006, 9).  The direct 
election of the European Parliament and the process of constitutional development  
leading up to the Lisbon Treaty in some ways was intended as part of a process to address 
this dilemma by connecting voters and national parliaments more directly to the realities 
of multi-level governance and policy making in the EU.  For instance, the Citizens 
Initiative introduces a mechanism whereby European citizens can introduce a petition or 
request to the Commission to take up an issue or develop a policy proposition on any 
issue for which they have authority (trade, agriculture, etc.).  The initiative requires the 
participation of seven individuals from seven different Member States who submit a 
proposal that must then acquire a minimum of one million signatures from citizens from 
at least seven different Member States.  To address the concerns of national parliaments 
that they were in a sense becoming the “biggest losers” from expanding policy 
integration and the increasing powers of the EU parliament, the Lisbon Treaty introduced 
an early-warning mechanism whereby national parliaments can indicate whether a 
Commission proposal threatens to violate the subsidiarity principle, which states that the 
EU will not take action unless it is more effective than action taken at a national, 
regional, or local level.  If one-third of national parliaments submit such an objection, the 
Commission must review the proposal—known as a yellow card.  If a simple majority of 
national parliaments objects, then the Council and European Parliament can reject the 
proposal immediately—an orange card.   
 These measures illustrate that EU leaders have certainly not been oblivious to the 
political dilemmas Schmidt was pointing out but it is worth remembering that as the sole 
directly elected body among the EU institutions and in the face of persistent criticisms of 
the democratic deficit, it is only logical that European Parliament (EP hereafter) come 
into its own as a fuller, more legitimate political actor.  Indeed the EP’s decision making 
authority has incrementally expanded from an advisory and consultative (Treaty of Paris 
1952 and Treaties of Rome 1957) to a cooperative role (Single European Act 1986) 
giving the EP the right to a second reading for certain laws being considered by the 
Council, to its current role as a full legislative actor initiated with the co-decision 
procedure and rights to a third reading introduced by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, 
extended in the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 and further strengthened with the 2009 Lisbon 
Treaty.  In addition to these legislative powers, the Parliament also exercises joint powers 
with the Council over fixing the EU budget and enjoys supervisory authority over other 
EU institutions, including the right to approve the College of Commissioners, and with a 
two-thirds majority, to force the resignation of the Commission through a vote of 
censure.  In short, nothing very important can happen in the EU without the agreement of 
the EP.  Because the EP functions in an overarching political system that is partly 
supranational and partly intergovernmental, there are nonetheless significant constraints 
on its power, in particular, its inability to introduce legislation and raise revenue—the 
classic instruments of power wielded by traditional legislatures.  However, in an 
empirical analysis of the EP’s relative policy making authority vis-à-vis national 
parliaments, Bergman and Raunio concluded that “...MEPs probably have a more direct 
impact on policy outputs at the EU level than many national MPs have on national-level 
policy (2001, 123).  The Lisbon Treaty continued this trend by extending the legislative 
authority of the EP to 40 new policy areas and requiring Parliament’s approval for 
international treaties and increased budgetary oversight, essentially making the EP an 
even stronger co-legislator with the Council.    
 This gradual enhancement of the EP’s power has not been matched by a 
corresponding affection among voters for the institution and as the historical trend shows, 
in each parliamentary election, voter turnout has steadily decreased.  It is worth noting 
that the decline in the most recent election was not as significant as the drop-off between 
the 2004 and 2009 elections and in fact the turnout difference between 2009 and 2014 is 
pretty trivial, though the negative headlines in the media certainly belied this simple fact.  
  
 
 
 
 It is also important to compare these results with the general trend across the 
advanced democracies over the same period of time.  As the next table shows, the clear 
pattern is one of declining voter turnout in almost all of the trilateral3 countries, which the 
study by Pharr and Putnam diagnosed as “disaffected democracies” and decried the fact 
that as more countries than ever before were adopting democratic systems of government, 
voters in the established democracies were growing increasingly apathetic and 
disinterested in the ballot box.  Though published in early 2000, their analysis proved 
prescient and continues to hold true.  In the recent U.S. congressional midterm elections 
for example, the national turnout was 36.3 %, the worst record in any U.S. federal 
election over the past 72 years4.  
 
 
 
                                                            
3 The term trilateral refers to the countries of Western Europe, North America and Japan and was coined 
with the establishment of the Trilateral Commission in 1973.  
4 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/opinion/the-worst-voter-turnout-in-72-
years.html?_r=0 
 
While these comparisons provide perspective and a much needed counterpoint to the 
overwhelmingly negative and somewhat misleading reports by the global media, it is 
the relative success of the extreme right parties that represents the biggest cause for 
concern given that they uniformly want to undermine the whole spirit of the European 
project even if there are considerable differences among the parties.  As the analysis 
in the next section will show, the relative lack of unity also precludes the radical right 
from exercising any significant influence within the parliament.  This does not, 
however, diminish the symbolic and political significance of their electoral advance 
and their victories in France and the UK.  An analysis of the ideological and partisan 
trends in both the national and the European elections over time shows that there is a 
broad tendency of EU elections to reflect the political trends in domestic politics.  In 
other words, EU elections cannot be described in a general sense as vehicles for 
proxy or protest votes.  Instead, election data show that the ideological makeup of the 
European Parliament has largely reflected the trends that are seen in national 
parliamentary elections.   In the early period, we see relative parity between center-
right and center-left in the elections of 1979 and 1984.  Around the time of the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, however we do see a slight change as there is a rise of center-right 
parties at the national level but a dominance of center-left groups in the EU.  
However, elections in 1994 largely resulted in parity again between center-left and 
center-right parties, which could be related to the salience and contentiousness of 
European issues as the Maastricht Treaty had just been ratified and referenda had 
been held in Denmark and France drawing even more attention to the stakes of the 
treaty that would lay the groundwork for the single currency.  It is notable that we 
also see the rise of far-right groups in this period at least in the 1994 national 
elections.  The 1999 and 2004 elections see emergence of center-right groups and a 
slight decrease in far-left groups, both at national and EU levels.  Most telling are the 
results from the 2009 and 2014 elections with the former just on the heels of the 
global financial crisis and the latter at the climax of the Eurozone crisis.  Although we 
see a clear dominance of center-right groups over center-left parties, there are 
increases in both far-left and far-right groups.   The data clearly track a trend of 
decline among far-left groups at the EU level since the first elections of 1979, which 
is not particularly surprising given the disarray and fractured nature of many of the 
communist and other left-wing parties.   Importantly, the data also show that 
representation of conservative, far-right, nationalist, and Euroskeptic groups in the 
EU had also been steadily decreasing since 1979, until 2014, which saw a significant 
uptick.    
   
 
 Party Ideologies Represented at EU and National Levels, 1979-2014 

 Notes about data: These graphs were created by using party data from the European Election Database. 
Parties were assigned to an ideological category based on domestic context. Only national elections that 
coincided with a European Union parliamentary election are represented. Note that the percentage 
displayed for national elections reflects the popular vote, while the percentage for EU elections represents 
the grouping of seats within the European Parliament, not the popular vote.  The authors gratefully 
acknowledge the research assistance of Josh Jacob in compiling the data and constructing the graphs.  
 Two central points emerge from this brief analysis of election trends. First, 
economic duress breeds extremism and second, there is no significant ideological 
discrepancy between electoral politics at the EU and the national levels, which confirms a 
‘normalization’ of politics within the EU.   This phenomenon has been underway for the 
past two decades as many authors have noted (Checkel and Katzenstein 2009; Risse 
2010).  Recent research has further confirmed the trend as characterized by Risse:  “EU 
politics is losing its technocratic and depoliticized nature and is becoming “normal” 
politics subject to similar debates and controversies, as in the case of domestic affairs 
(2015: 3).    The growing politicization of European affairs in the domestic politics of 
member states is thus an important and positive development in terms of transnational 
democratic deliberation and at least institutionally speaking this could be interpreted as 
holding a favorable lesson for the prospects of democratization of global politics.   
Furthermore, as alarming and repugnant as many of the ideas and values embodied in 
some of the more overtly xenophobic and nationalistic parties achieving electoral 
success, these results are just as much a socio-economic and cultural crisis within 
domestic societies as a political crisis within the EU.   
 Analysis of voter turnout in national elections which took place simultaneously 
with European Parliamentary elections (See Appendix for data; note that countries which 
have mandatory voting were excluded from the analysis) reveal that whereas voters do 
indeed show up in higher numbers for domestic elections, the gap is not as significant as 
might be commonly assumed.  This comparison has obvious limitations in that there are 
different member states holding national elections in each instance of EU level elections 
and electoral politics differ from country to country; nonetheless, we see over the span of 
these elections that voter turnout in each of the national elections was not extraordinarily 
higher than the turnout for the at least half of the EP elections in 1989, 1994, 2004 and to 
a lesser extent 2009, yet the most recent election had a fairly substantial gap.  Ultimately 
we can conclude then that national politics may be drawing more interest as expressed 
through voter turnout, but these comparisons also show that the turnout is not as abysmal 
as is often suggested.  That is not to argue that national political identities are waning in 
favor of an emerging European identity.  National identities and discourses are 
remarkably tenacious as confirmed not only at the ballot box but also borne out in survey 
research.  Data from both the Eurobarometer and the World Values Survey consistently 
show that the majority of individuals identify first and foremost with their nation.  In 
2013, only 46 percent of Europeans conveyed that they feel an attachment to the EU, 
whereas 52 percent feel no such connection; by contrast, 87 percent express attachment to 
their town or city, and 91 percent to their country.  European identity exists, but only 9 
percent of the respondents identify themselves primarily as European, whereas 87 percent 
give their nationality as their primary identification5.   A more extensive academic 
examination of the concept of European identity documented a slightly stronger case of 
European identity but still found that in no EU Member State (except Luxembourg) does 
the percentage of citizens who think of themselves mainly as European rise above 16 
percent (Fligstein 2008:). As studies have shown, education and income are fairly strong 
determinants of European identity with the most well-off and better educated more likely 
to see themselves as Europeans as they are the groups who can reap the benefits of 
market integration and mobility whereas the older, less educated and poorer citizens 
cannot.  Fligstein’s recent sociological study sums it up thusly:  
Put simply, most citizens in different countries want their nation-states to 
protect them from the vagaries of the economy, illness, and old age. This 
sets up a potential clash in each nation-state between the winners of 
economic integration, many of who identify themselves as Europeans, and 
the losers of economic integration, many of whom remain wedded to 
national identities (2008: 245).  
 
 The global economic crisis, which expedited and worsened the euro and sovereign 
debt crises combined with the austerity measures and the further deterioration of the 
economies in many of the EU countries drew out this tendency even more as the 
following analysis of the 2014 election will highlight.  
 
                                                            
5 Standard Eurobarometer 80, Autumn 2013. As reported in: 
http://carnegieeurope.eu/2015/01/26/emotional-intelligence-for-eu-
democracy/i0nq?mkt_tok=3RkMMJWWfF9wsRoluKTNZKXonjHpfsX57u0lXa6g38431UFwdcjKPmjr1Y
AFTMR0aPyQAgobGp5I5FEIQ7XYTLB2t60MWA%3D%3D 
 
 
Contextualizing the 2014 EU Parliamentary Elections 
 The 2014 European Parliamentary elections provided a platform for right wing 
anti-EU parties to break through in national elections in several EU member states. This 
was initially seen as a potential threat to the whole European supranational integration 
project of which the direct election of MEPs is an integral part. The visions of the future 
of Europe presented by such parties have in common a rejection of further political and 
economic integration even if these visions vary between those calling for exit from the 
Union or just the single currency. Distrust of all EU institutions, a desire to return power 
to national institutions, opposition to further EU enlargement and calls for reduced 
immigration form part of the common ground of populist and extreme right MEPs and 
this distinguishes them very clearly from left-wing challengers to Europe’s mainstream 
parties.  In some cases the origins of the parties concerned date back to the post-war era 
during which neo-Nazi and “new right” alternatives to the European idea continued to 
circulate in intellectual and activist circles. Since the second euro-elections of 1984 
extreme right parties have, from time to time, achieved electoral success. Since the early 
1990s referenda and elections have provided signals of an increasing challenge to the 
official narrative of European integration embodied, most notably, in the failed attempt to 
achieve ratification of the draft Constitution for Europe.  
 The deepening economic and social problems in many parts of Europe are part of 
the political context but do not explain the attraction of the radically different view of 
Europe’s future for which the extreme right stands. Seventy years after the end of the 
Second World War and 25 years since end of the Cold War, the success of these 
particular challengers may also represent a failure of the EU institutions and mainstream 
leaders to modernise their own narrative in a way which convinces a new generation of 
Europeans that the original idea behind this project remains relevant and worthy of 
support. Given the relevance of the EU model and the global significance of political 
stability in the region the potential global significance of such a crisis have not been lost 
on other powers. Looking around the landscape of the European Union early in 2015, the 
casual observer may wonder what happened to the political earthquake announced around 
the time of the time of the May 2014 European Parliament elections? Amongst the direst 
predictions was not only a surge in support for parties challenging the very idea of 
European integration to the election of a “self-hating Parliament.” (Leonard 2013) In fact, 
around 30% of seats in the current legislature are held by members who could to varying 
degrees, and with varying solutions be considered as opposing key aspects of EU policy 
or seeking to advance their countries´ exit from the Union. Even if this can be described 
as an earthquake it does not, so far at least, appear to have led to a breakdown in the 
functioning of the EU in general or the European Parliament in particular. 
Less than 9 months earlier two apparently rising stars on the Eurosceptic right, Marine Le 
Pen of the French National Front and Geert Wilders of the Dutch Freedom Party had 
announced their joint plan to ¨wreck the EU from within (Ian Traynor, The Guardian 
15.11.13). In fact Wilders party fell short of his expected progress in the elections and 
even though his French ally performed better than ever the two of them did not establish 
enough momentum or support to establish a functioning alliance after the election results 
came in.  Even before the elections there were some experts doubting the severity of the 
storm about to hit the EU.  Cas Mudde wrote in March 2014 that in spite of obvious voter 
concerns at the economic situation or the perceived rise in immigration “neither the far 
right or the anti-European populists are on track to win a significant victory in the 
upcoming European elections.” * Cas Mudde University of Georgia March 2014 .With 
70% of MEPs still committed, in spite of policy differences, to making the EU function 
as effectively as possible it would clearly be an exaggeration to see the elections as some 
kind of watershed victory for those who want to destroy it. 
 In this paper we are trying to assess these events and their on-going aftermath in 
terms of their possible significance for transnational governance and, therefore, an 
election which is being interpreted as announcing the possible failure of the EU project is 
particularly relevant, even if, in our view, it is far too early to jump to any particular 
conclusion.  One specific factual element is not open to dispute: the 43% turnout in the 
2014 elections (more or less the same as in 2009 after a steady decrease from the 62% 
turnout in the first such elections in 1979) does suggest that these elections remain 
entrenched as something of a minority interest. In this view, based on the social 
background of those who actually did vote the British pollster, Peter Kellner of 
YOUGOV suggests that the “ surge of insurgent parties is the political consequence of 
the economic trends that Thomas Piketty described in his work on rising inequality.” * 
New Statesman 5.6.14 
As Piedrofalta and Lauenroth  had perceptively predicted that 
“ final turnout will be decided by a mix of apathy and anger on the part of the 
electorate….the increased fragmentation and radicalisation of the next EP that polls 
suggest might complicate the adoption of decisions in a number of policy areas and 
accentuate the conflict between national and European levels and tensions among 
member states.”  (2014: 11) 
 This is perhaps a more sober definition of the expected earthquake as compared 
with media comments around the time of the elections. Indeed it is necessary to look at 
the impact of the elections not just on day to day operations in Brussels and Strasbourg 
but also on national politics and the relations between particular governments and the EU 
more generally.  The victory in Britain of the UKIP has, for example, led the current 
British Prime Minister to take up positions on EU reform which have heightened the risk 
to continued British membership of the EU. In Sweden the strengthened Swedish 
Democrats who won two seats in the EP last May helped in November to bring down the 
newly elected centre-left government.  Even so our casual observer limiting his 
observations to what is going on inside the European Parliament itself might come to the 
view summarised by Oliver Treib ( 2014) of a situation where “ the voters say no , but 
nobody listens.” The EP continues to be presided over by German Social Democrat 
Martin Schulz as it has been since January 2012.Following his party´s failure to win the 
largest proportion of seats in the EP, Mr. Schulz accepted the logic of his personal and 
institutional position and the supported the EPP candidate for Commission President Mr. 
Juncker represented some kind of continuity following 19 years as a member of the 
European Council. Although his party the EPP lost 70 seats the party still claimed the top 
job with support not just from the mainstream left and the Liberals but also from the 
Greens and the far left. 
 To argue that the establishment of a broad form of co-operation made up of 
parties supporting continued European integration represents a failure to listen to the 
voters is something of an exaggeration. The EU is not perhaps a classical parliamentary 
democracy but the majority, if it can prove stable, has the right and indeed the 
responsibility to act effectively with its opponents free to act upon their own quite 
different views.  The debate is still on-going as to whether the “ spitzenkandidaten” 
system was just a power grab by Parliament or a step towards a strengthening the 
legitimacy of the EU institutions. The integrationist majority had been clear in advance of 
election day that “this time it’s different.” Such an outcome is not just business as usual 
especially when Mr. Juncker himself describes his term of office as some kind of “ last 
chance” for the EU to stabilise and advance in the face of increasing domestic and 
external challenges. Mr. Schulz has made similar remarks and indeed far from becoming 
a self-hating institution the Parliament shows signs of being all too aware of the 
challenges it faces. 
 Within the institution it was always likely that the bite of the opponents of 
integration would be much less substantial than their bark but before looking at the 
reasons this is the case it is necessary to look closer at the nature of this particular 
political phenomenon.  Certainly it is somewhat ironic that participation in the euro-
elections held up at the same level precisely because of increased mobilisation by parties 
intending to use their seats in parliament not just to attack the EU from within but also, 
primarily, to advance their impact at national level. In the decades since 1979 the logic of 
the idea of a directly elected Parliament seemed to be working more or less as expected. 
Slowly but surely an Assembly with hardly any power developed its budgetary and 
legislative powers into a joint authority with the member states represented in the 
Council. With the power to elect the Commission President and to ratify treaties with 
other countries the EP had come of age and not by abrogating power but by making its 
ambitions plain and negotiating a series of treaties whereby the EEC became the EU. 
 Equally clearly the sense of citizen engagement which might have been expected 
to emerge alongside such a major constitutional development has not materialised. Even 
here any rush to judgement or simplification based on recent events should be resisted. 
The million signature petition calling on the EU to stop negotiations with the US for a 
TTIP has been presented to the Parliament which, most likely during its current term, will 
be called upon to ratify it. The outcome of the 2014 EP election does indeed oblige the 
mainstream majority to be all the more sensitive to the need to be seen as not ignoring 
public opinion. The insurgents are, however, a very diverse and indeed divided grouping 
even if for the purposes of this paper we leave out the strengthened left wing challenge to 
the mainstream which has been very successful in Greece and Spain and concentrates its 
criticism on economic policy rather than any wholesale rejection of the EU project. 
 Within days of the European elections it became clear that Ms Le Pen and Mr 
Wilders were not only in no position to wreck the Union from within but they were not 
even in a position to form a European Parliament Group (requirement: minimum of 25 
MEPs format least 7 member states. In fact the earthquake image underestimated the 
heterogeneity of this part of Europe’s political landscape (Bertocino and Koenig 2014). 
have produced one of the earliest attempts to assess the composition and impact of the 
euro-sceptics arguing that the term itself represents an over-inclusive category. They have 
attempted a more precise distinction between more moderate euro-sceptics and what they 
define as Europhobes. Basically they distinguish between reformist critics of the EU and 
those who want to pull out of the Union or at least the Eurozone and/or Schengen. In their 
calculation there are now 30 euro-sceptic parties from 18 countries with a total of 125 
seats in the EP, i.e.16.6% of the total. They are, in fact so divided and dispersed that they 
sit in three different political groups, with some, Le Pen included, left among the “ non-
attached.” In effect this substantially reduces whatever chances such a relative and 
divided minority has to really influence EP decisions let alone EU legislation and policy 
making. 
 The other grouping or category relevant to our analysis is the Europhobes who the 
same authors calculate as coming from 16 parties and 13 member states with a total of 82 
MEPs, namely 10.9% of the total. In fact “due to their diverse convictions and exit 
preferences as well as their structural difficulty to form cohesive political or voting 
alliances, they are less likely to shape political decisions in the EP.”(*Bertocino and 
Koenig) 
 Together, in spite of their heterogeneity, these parties do indeed represent a 
challenge to the remaining 72.4% of members of the institution. Their presence certainly 
does confirm the end of the “permissive consensus” which had hitherto facilitated 
European integration. Even this is not, however, really a new phenomenon. The French 
National Front scored its first electoral breakthrough in the second EP elections of 1984 
and their presence in fact led the Parliament and the EU more generally to become 
increasingly active in coming to terms with racism and xenophobia. (Harris 1993) 
Numerous referenda in France, the Netherlands and Ireland have shown the difficulty of 
assuring public support for deeper integration. The economic stagnation and continuing 
uncertainty as to the future of the Eurozone economy confirms a reality that lead 
President Juncker to describe dramatically his term of office as a “ last chance “ to save 
the project. Even so it is necessary to avoid over-simplification. 
 As Cas Mudde (* op.cit) observed before the 2014 election “ the economic crisis 
has caused an increase in public dissatisfaction with both European and national elites, 
as well as electoral losses for most governing parties in EU member states. But there is 
no clear trend in the electoral fortunes of far right parties. Overall the Great Recession 
has not produced a sharp rise in support for far right parties, and neither the far right 
nor the anti-European populists are on track to win a significant victory in the upcoming 
European Parliament elections.”  He also reiterated the view that “terminological 
confusion and conceptual stretching have always muddied the debate about the far right” 
and emphasised the “nativist” nature of such parties with their combination of 
nationalism and xenophobia. 
 A few weeks before the elections PEW Research produced a major opinion 
survey with title “Fragile rebound for EU image threatened by disaffection with Brussels, 
Immigration.” This poll encapsulated the voters´ mood which the elections confirmed. 
The salience of the issue of immigration confirms how to a great extent anti-immigrant 
politicians use their European platform as little more than a base to advance their national 
strategies. With over 50% of those polled wanting to “allow fewer immigrants into our 
country” parties wishing to attract their support are obliged to campaign for action at 
national level. The EU is based upon free movement within its borders and the desire to 
curb immigration (often linked with anti-Muslim or anti-Roma sentiments) reflects 
concerned being felt very much at local level with the only possible response coming 
from the national government action. By way of example the UKIP victory in May 2014 
led the British Conservative Prime Minister to respond to this political reality with plans 
to act against immigration in a way that could endanger his avowed ambition for Britain 
to stay as a member of a reformed EU. It is also worth noting that Wilders PVV in the 
Netherlands failed to increase its level of support after he shifted his emphasis away from 
immigration and towards his alliance with Ms Le Pen with the objective of precipitating 
the collapse of the EU. 
 The distinction between euro-scepticism and Europhobia (or even neo-Fascism) is 
much more than a question of terminological clarity. Parties such as Jobbik in Hungary or 
Golden Dawn in Greece fall into the latter category and find themselves operating on the 
birders of legality with members facing prosecution for violence, threats to democracy or 
hate speech. Ironically the Republican US Senator John McCain accused Hungary’s 
Prime Minister of being “ neo-Fascist. “ This followed controversial changes to the 
constitution of Hungary and Mr Orban’s explicit commitment to develop some form of 
“illiberal democracy.” Sometimes the line of distinction between the views of Orban’s 
FIDESZ party and those of Jobbik are not clear. The Senator’s remarks reflect concerns 
in the US that Europe is not doing enough to respond to increasing anti-Semitism and 
racism. In this case Mr Orban is the Prime Minister of his country and leads a party fully 
integrated into the mainstream EPP whose leader Joseph Daul publicly supports him and 
welcomes his electoral victories. One of Orban’s closest allies is the Vice-chairman of the 
EPP group in the European Parliament. This is the party also of Jean-Claude Juncker. 
 If then we can, for the moment, conclude that the various xenophobic and 
nationalist parties do not seem to be in a position to destroy the EU from within the 
question arises as to how the mainstream majority, working in a broad coalition to help 
Mr Juncker to achieve a successful term, has reacted to the presence of such parties 
within the Parliament.  Further research such as drawing up reports on policy matters or 
examining items of legislation would be necessary to address this question.   
 Experience of coalitions in West Germany or Italy can suggest that they leave 
open spaces for anti-system radicals of all kinds, even terrorists, denouncing the political 
failure or self-serving arrangements which voters are encouraged to perceive as an abuse 
of power. That is certainly a risk but even those who question the nature of the Juncker 
coalition have not come up with any convincing alternative arrangement in terms of 
personnel or policy.  The first thing that can be observed as a reaction by the political 
mainstream is that there has been no attempt to prevent the MEPs elected as members of 
parties critical of the EU from exercising their full rights as MEPs. The rules which apply 
to the formation of groups and the occupation of places in parliamentary committees have 
been applied to them in the same way as applies to all other MEPs. They receive the 
resources of staff, funding and office space as individuals and members of groups in 
accordance with established arrangements. Whilst it is too early to make an objective 
judgement there is anecdotal evidence that these particular MEPs are not particularly 
active in committee work and certainly the other groups are not ready to see them in any 
positions of leadership in committees or to appoint any of them to draw up reports on 
policy matters or legislative proposals. This does not prevent them as individuals or 
members of groups from speaking, tabling resolutions or travelling as members of 
parliamentary delegations. They can use the facilities of the EP information offices in the 
member states or invite their constituents to visit the Parliament in Brussels or 
Strasbourg.  For example, one of the major issues to be dealt with in the current 
legislative term is the TTIP and Ms Le Pen has astutely taken up a position in the 
Parliament’s International Trade Committee to ensure for herself an excellent prominent 
platform to denounce the US and the European Commission for the threats they bring, in 
her view, to French identity and interests. 
 In the first weeks of Mr. Juncker’s term revelations concerning tax avoidance 
schemes in his native Luxembourg put him on the defensive. His critics were not limited 
to the extremists all too quick to attack him and they even saw the “ Luxleaks” scandal as 
an early chance to sap his credibility. Having firmly rejected any alliance with the French 
National Front, the political group of which UKIP is a member with its Italian Five Star 
Movement members jointly tabled a motion of censure calling for Mr Juncker to resign 
already. Left wing and Green critics of Juncker refused to support this proposal which in 
the end drew just over 100 votes, far short of the two-thirds required to achieve its 
objective.  In the run-up to the 2014 elections the second largest European parliamentary 
group, the Socialists and Democrats, was concerned enough at the potential threat to 
analyse and attempt to find a response to what it had already identified as a threat from 
extremism and populism. In the report it prepared, the Groups then Chairman Hannes 
Swoboda from Austria argued that ¨Today as we celebrate the anniversary of the tragic 
events of 1914, that marked the beginning of World War 1….we need to remember that 
Europe was born from this tragedy to secure peace, welfare, prosperity and ensure that 
nationalism and populism would never again lead the way. If we look at the European 
Union today we cannot say these core objectives of the European project have yet been 
secured. New nationalisms and new movements and parties using fear and hatred against 
minorities are again on the rise and new divisions between East and West, North and 
South are created and exploited. The truth is that the European Union today is, in many 
ways, failing to fulfil its promises and duties.”(Extremism Working Group Report? 2014 
p 4). 
 Around the same time the German Marshall Fund published its own study posing 
questions about the “unstoppable rise “of the far right and arguing that “right-populists 
can only increase their vote if established, moderate political actors have already 
legitimised their arguments.” (GMF The Unstoppable Far Right, Timo Lochocki 
?2014). Rather than trying to compete on the populists´terrain Mark Leonard argued that 
“Europe needs more politics and more disagreements. Rather than huddling together 
mainstream parties need to give people real choice and address the issues that really 
concern people.” (ECFR op. cit. p.10) 
 The events following the May 2014 elections could be seen precisely as a form of 
huddling together by the main party groups in the European Parliament leading such an 
observer as Oliver Treib to argue that “excluding the growing camp of Euro-sceptics 
from the EU´s corridors of power could prove fatal in the long run.” Teri opacity 
p.1552) 
 This may sound convincing but to suggest that somehow the European 
Commission should include such elements amongst its members does not seem a feasible 
approach rejection of the very institutional structure to which they have been elected with 
a view to weakening it or destroying it altogether. Even Alexis Tsirpas from a left party 
Syriza in Greece accepted the logic of the procedure by which Mr. Juncker was elected.  
In advance of the election Mark Leonard had expressed the concern that this would be 
seen merely as “business as usual. “ His proposal was to go beyond the consideration of 
proposals for “ more Europe,” recognise the real structural and policy problems the EU 
faces and “instead of forming a pro-European they should try to create the space for the 
political battles between competing visions of Europe and thereby try to preserve left-
right competition on both national and European levels.” ( ECFR op. cit p.9)   
 Again this sounds an attractive and quite different idea from Treib and from what 
is now functioning in Brussels and Strasbourg, sometimes described as the “ Juncker 
coalition.” In fact, in the meantime urgent decisions have to be made on the economy, 
Russian aggression or TTIP negotiations. Such decisions require often majorities in the 
Council and Parliament and are also issues being taken up by the right-wing challengers 
to the European mainstream.  Indeed whilst the US is increasingly concerned about the 
stability of Europe, there is much evidence that Russia is actively developing 
relationships with parties opposing further European integration. The Centre for 
European Strategic Intelligence (www.cesieuropeanintelligence.org) has found 
confirmation of support to such parties in the UK, France, Hungary, Bulgaria and 
Greece.) This appears to be a recycling of a Soviet era practice whereby the USSR 
subsidised parties and movements whose objectives fitted in with their objectives. 
Support for anti-TTIP or anti- fracking movements is perhaps less of a concern than  an 
EU Member State Prime Minister seeing Putin as some kind of model for the “ illiberal 
democracy” he favours in Hungary. Combined with diplomacy, soft power and modern 
communications it remains to be seen what will be achieved by Russia as it clearly seeks 
to weaken the EU, its relationship with the US and its ability to unite effectively in 
support of its neighbours in the east and south-east. Inquiries have been initiated in the 
European Parliament in relations to financial arrangements between Russia and MEPs 
from France and Hungary. 
 The European Union is a unique political entity and the political and economic 
significance of its current internal challenges are clear enough. As the problems it faces 
are not amenable to any quick solutions the ant-European populist tide is, at least, likely 
to remain a fixed part of Europe´s political life. Unfolding developments and upcoming 
elections in the UK, France, Greece and Sweden will provide the successful parties with a 
chance to build on their euro-election successes.  It is, however, not yet clear what global 
lessons can be drawn from this regional crisis. It is, however, already apparent that if the 
EU fails to overcome its current difficulties other powers will be affected. Russia is 
enjoying the political spectacle even if it has so far failed to undermine European and 
trans-Atlantic unity which has led to it facing very strong economic sanctions following 
its intervention in Ukraine. Its allies in the EU oppose these measures and sometimes 
actively support Russian action, for example in relation to elections in occupied parts of 
Ukraine. China has tended to prefer a stronger EU as a counter-balance to the US and 
would be happy enough to see problems with the TTIP which it perceives as a geo-
strategic challenge. The US itself has publicly expressed concerns about developments in 
Hungary and for the opposite reason from China is concerned at rising populist 
opposition to TTIP. NGOs such as Human Rights First (We are not Nazis but…the rise 
of Hate Parties in Hungary and Greece and why America should care. August 2014) 
have contributed to a wider awareness in the US of the threat to political stability in 
Europe which may be developing. 
 This awareness of what may be at stake in terms of a challenge to post-cold war 
European stability was publicly expressed by US Ambassador Samantha Power in Berlin 
on November 13th 2014 when she addressed the OSCE´s Berlin Conference on Anti-
Semitism) and referred publicly and specifically to the outcome of the May euro-election 
results saying calling on those present to “look at May´s European parliamentary 
elections. In Denmark the anti-immigrant Danish Peoples´ Party finished first. In France, 
the far right National Front won over a quarter of the vote-more than any other party. In 
Greece the overly anti-Semitic and xenophobic Golden Dawn received 10% of the 
vote…..in Hungary- where extreme ethnic nationalist Jobbik party finished second in 
May elections and where public opinion polling has shown a high level of anti-
Semitism…” she referred to also to Hungarian Government actions to limit the activities 
of NGOs and to build a monument to the “ victims of German occupation” without 
mentioning the role of the war-time Hungarian Government and citizens in the 
extermination of Jews. “There is an important lesson here: rising anti-Semitism is rarely 
the lone or last manifestation of intolerance in a society. Quite the contrary, it is often the 
canary in the coal mine for the degradation of human rights more broadly.”  For the 
moment European Ministers have not drawn these threads together so clearly. The 
European Parliament´s Civil Liberties Committee which, in the last term, produced a 
report on developments in Hungary (Tavares report….) has held a hearing and the 
Hungarian member of the European Commission was stripped of his responsibility for 
EU cultural policy but confirmed on office as another consequence of coalition building 
in the EP. 
 The European elections of May 2014 may or not be defined as an earthquake but 
the results and consequent developments provide a test for the credibility and, maybe, the 
survival of the European project. 
 
Conclusion 
 The recent elections as now seen against the backdrop of the on-going difficulties 
of stabilizing the Eurozone, the falling value of the Euro, the Greek elections and the 
threat of a “Grexit” should compromises not be reached through some form of debt 
forgiveness or restructuring, and the Swiss decision to de-peg the Swiss Franc from the 
Euro,  all add up to an even worsening regional political crisis.   The real irony however 
is that the EU for all of its flaws nonetheless represents the most developed transnational 
and democratically legitimate institutional response to the realities of an ever integrated 
world economy that under neoliberalism has not been met with proper mechanisms of 
global regulation.  The EU is both a product of and a response to the globalization 
phenomenon and it is the only region that offers levers of democratic control and 
coordination beyond national capitals, yet the current leaders squandered the opportunity 
to defend the European social model and have instead become more neoliberal than the 
very progenitor of the Washington consensus.  As the economist Dani Rodrick pointed 
out in The Globalization Paradox we can’t have hyper-globalization, democracy, and 
national self-determination all at once.  At most, we can choose two out of the three.  
Rodrick sees Europe as a halfway house, a well -developed model of economic 
integration and regional hyper-globalism where democratic and political institutions and 
infrastructure remain a work in progress but when economics are under stress, the 
response (discourse, policy preferences of the dominant) is overwhelmingly national.  
Effective transnational governance in the midst of a global economic crisis which also 
laid bare the wildly varying macroeconomic conditions among the members of the 
Eurozone requires a solidarity that thus far is proving absent as confirmed by both the 
rising strength of the radical right parties as well as the survey research that confirms the 
predominance and persistence of national identity over a common European identity.   
However, the success of Syriza and the mounting popularity of Podemos may mark a 
shift in national and transnational political responses to the economic crisis and shake up 
or wake up call to the mainstream center-left and center-right parties in a way that will 
redress the excesses of austerity policies.  It is too soon to draw any definitive 
conclusions, but the recent compromise struck in Brussels and the tentative reprieve for 
Greece underscore that the linkages between domestic and European level politics matter 
more than ever.  As Mr. Schäuble said to the Bundestag in his defense of the latest deal 
for Greece, “We Germans should do everything possible to keep Europe together as 
much as we can.” (BBC 2014)  If Europe cannot get this right and move forward by 
hanging together, then there is little hope that the global economy can ever be managed in 
a more humane and social just manner.   
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